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1 Introduction
This paper studies how changing expectations concerning future trade and financial conditions are
reflected in international external positions. Economic theory links a country’s net foreign asset
(NFA) position to agents’ expectations in a precise manner. In the absence of Ponzi schemes and
arbitrage opportunities, the NFA position of any country must equal the expected present discounted
value of future trade deficits, discounted at the cumulated world stochastic discount factor (SDF)
that prices all freely traded financial assets. In practice this means that changes in observed external
positions of countries across the world should reflect changing expectations about future trade flows
and future financial conditions represented by the world SDF, or some combination of the two. The
aim of this paper is to assess whether this is in fact the case. More specifically, the paper examines
the extent to which changing expectations about future trade and financial conditions are reflected
in the evolving external positions of 12 countries between 1970 and 2011.
To undertake this analysis, I present an new analytic framework that links each country’s current
NFA position to its current trade flows, expectations of future trade flows, and expectations concern-
ing future returns on foreign assets and liabilities in an environment without arbitrage opportunities
or Ponzi schemes. This framework incorporates several key features. First it accommodates the
secular increase in international trade flows and national gross asset/liability positions that have
taken place over the past 40 years. The secular growth in both trade flows and positions greatly
exceeds the growth in GDP on a global and country-by-country basis. Between 1970 and 2011,
the annual growth in trade and positions exceeds the growth in GDP by an average of 2.6 and 4.8
percent, respectively, across the countries studied.1
The second key feature concerns the identification of expected future returns. As a matter of
logic, expected future returns on a country’s asset and liability portfolios must aﬀect the value of its
current NFA position, so pinning down these expectations is unavoidable when studying the drivers
of external positions. This is easily done in textbook models where the only internationally traded
asset is a risk free bond, but in the real world countries’ asset and liability portfolios comprise equity,
FDI, bonds and other securities, with risky and volatile returns. Pinning down the expected future
returns on these portfolios requires forecasts for the future returns on diﬀerent securities and the
composition of the portfolios. To avoid these complications, I use no-arbitrage conditions to identify
the impact of expected future returns on NFA positions via forecasts of a single variable, the world
SDF. SDFs play a central role in modern finance theory (linking security prices and cash flows) and
appear in theoretical examinations of the determinants of NFA positions (see, e.g., Obstfeld, 2012).
A key step in my analysis is to show how the world SDF can be constructed from data on returns
and then used to pin down how expectations concerning future financial conditions are reflected in
external positions.
1This feature of the data has proved to be a challenge for researchers studying the determinants of external
positions, see e.g., Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) and Corsetti and Konstantinou (2012) discussed below.
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In the empirical analysis I study the external positions of 12 countries (Australia, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The United States and The United
Kingdom). I first show how the world SDF can be estimated from data on returns and discuss how
the estimates can be tested for specification errors. Next I turn to the identification of expectations.
In theory, external positions reflect expectations concerning the entire future paths of trade flows
and the world SDF, so we need to forecast over a wide range of horizons. For this purpose I use VARs
- a common approach in the literature following Campbell and Shiller (1987). I then compare the
present values of future trade flows and the world SDF based on the VAR forecasts with external
positions. If the actual expectations embedded in the external positions are well represented by
the VAR forecasts, the present values computed from those forecasts should be strongly correlated
with the external positions. This implication is borne out by my empirical findings using the VAR
forecasts for trade flows. Forecasts of trade flows far into the future are strongly correlated with
the external positions of 10 countries I study. Evidence on the role of expected future financial
conditions is less clear cut. While VAR forecasts for the world SDF suggest that there have been
persistent and sizable variations in the prospective future financial conditions that are relevant for
the determination of external positions, the forecasts are only weakly correlated with the positions of
many countries. One notable exception to this pattern is the United States, whose external position
is strongly correlated with the forecasts.
These findings add to a growing empirical and theoretical literature on international external
adjustment. The analytic framework I present is most closely related to the work of Gourinchas and
Rey (2007a). They derive an expression for a country’s NFA position from a “de-trended” version of
the consolidated budget constraint (that governs the evolution of a country’s NFA position from trade
flows and returns), that filters out the secular growth in trade flows and positions mentioned above.
Thus their analysis focuses on the “cyclical” variations in NFA positions, rather than the “total”
variations. Similarly, Corsetti and Konstantinou (2012) use the consolidated budget constraint to
derive an approximation to the current account that includes deterministic trends in the log ratios
of consumption, gross assets and gross liabilities to output to accommodate the long-term growth in
trade flows and positions (relative to GDP).2 On the theoretical side, Pavlova and Rigobon (2008),
Tille and van Wincoop (2010) and Devereux and Sutherland (2011) all study external adjustment in
open economy models with incomplete markets. In these models changing NFA positions primarily
reflect revisions in expected future trade flows and the world risk-free rate because the equilibrium
risk premia on foreign assets and liabilities are (approximately) constant. In contrast, the framework
I use allows for variations in the risk premia on assets and liabilities to also aﬀect NFA positions.
My analysis also extends a related literature on international returns. Early papers in this
2A related literature on external adjustment focuses attention on current account balances. For example, Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) examine how changes in current account balances between 2008 and 2010 relate to pre-
crisis current account gaps estimated from a panel regression model. Similar empirical models of current account
determination can be found in Chinn and Prasad (2003), Gruber and Kamin (2007), Lee et al. (2008), Gagnon
(2011) and others. Current accounts also remain a focus in current multilateral surveillance frameworks used by the
International Monetary Fund and the European Commission (see, e.g., IMF, 2012 and EU, 2010).
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literature (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2005; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005; Meissner and Taylor, 2006
and Gourinchas and Rey, 2007b) estimated that the return on U.S. foreign assets was on average
approximately three percent per year higher than the return on foreign liabilities. Subsequent papers
by Curcuru, Dvorak, and Warnock (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) argued that these
estimates were biased upward because of inaccuracies in data. In their recent survey, Gourinchas
and Rey (2013) show that alternative treatments of the data can produce average return diﬀerentials
between U.S. foreign assets and liabilities that diﬀer by as much as 1.1 and 1.8 percent, depending
upon the sample period. My analysis shifts the focus away from average U.S. returns in two respects.
First, I use the returns on the assets and liabilities of major economies to estimate the world SDF.
Second I model how conditional expectations concerning the world SDF are related to external
positions. Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) also consider the short-horizon (one quarter) forecasting
power of the (cyclical) U.S. external position for returns on its NFA portfolio, and the return
diﬀerential between equity assets and liabilities. Here I study forecasting power of external positions
over longer horizons.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data. I present the
analytic framework in Section 3. Section 4 describes how I estimate the world SDF and compute
long-horizon forecasts. I present the empirical results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
I examine the external positions of 12 countries: the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United States and the United Kingdom) together with Australia, China, India, South Korea
and Thailand. Data on each country’s foreign asset and liability portfolios and the returns on the
portfolios come from the databased constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001), updated in Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), available via the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. These
data provide information on the market value of the foreign asset and liability portfolios at the end
of each year together with the returns on the portfolios from the end of one year to the next. A
detailed discussion of how these data series are constructed can be found in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2009). I also use data on exports, imports and GDP for each country and data on the one year U.S.
T-bill rate, 10 year U.S. T-bond rate and U.S. inflation. All asset and liability positions, trade flows
and GDP levels are transformed into constant 2005 U.S. dollars using the prevailing exchange rates
and U.S. price deflator. All portfolio returns are similarly transformed into real U.S. returns. The
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti position data is constructed on an annual basis, so my analysis below is
conducted at an annual frequency.3 Although the span of individual data series diﬀers from country
3Ideally, we would like to track international positions and returns at a higher (e.g. quarterly) frequency, but
constructing the market value of foreign assets and liabilities for a large set of countries is a herculean task. For
the United States, Gourinchas and Rey (2005) compute quarterly market values for four categories of foreign asset
and liabilities: equity, foreign direct investment, debt and other, by combining data on international positions with
information on the capital gains and losses. In Evans (2012) I revise and update their data to 2012:IV. Corsetti
and Konstantinou (2012) also work with quarterly U.S. position data which they impute from the annual Milesi-
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to country, most of my analysis uses data spanning 1970-2011.
The Web Appendix describes the characteristics of the data in detail. Here I simply note several
prominent features. First, for many countries, variations in the ratios of net exports and NFA to
GDP are highly persistent. Second, the cross-country dispersion in the ratios has widened in the
last decade. Third, gross financial positions (i.e., the sum of foreign assets and liabilities) and trade
(i.e., the sum of export and imports) have grown much faster than GDP. Averaging across all the
countries, trade grew approximately 2.6 percent faster than GDP, while foreign asset and liability
positions grew 4.8 percent faster. There have also been swings in global trade growth and position
growth that are much larger than global business cycles. In light of these facts, the next section
presents an analytic framework that links a country’s current external position to prospective future
trade and financial conditions while accommodating the growth in trade and positions.
3 Analytic Framework
3.1 NFA Positions
The framework I develop contains three elements: (i) the consolidated budget constraint that links
a country’s foreign asset and liability positions to exports, imports and returns; (ii) a no-arbitrage
condition that restricts the behavior of returns; and (iii) a condition that rules out international
Ponzi schemes.
I begin with country’s n0s consolidated budget constraint:
FAn,t   FLn,t = Xn,t  Mn,t +Rfan,tFAn,t 1  Rfln,tFLn,t 1. (1)
Here FAn,t and FLn,t denote the value of foreign assets and liabilities of country n at the end of
year t, while Xn,t and Mn,t represent the flow of exports and imports during year t, all measured in
real terms (constant U.S. dollars). The gross real return on the foreign asset and liability portfolios
of country n between the end of years t   1 and t are denoted by Rfan,t and Rfln,t, respectively.
Equation (1) is no more than an accounting identity. It should hold true for any country provided
the underlying data on positions, trade flows and returns are accurate. Notice, also, that FAn,t and
FLn,t represent the values of portfolios of assets and liabilities comprising equity, bond and FDI
holdings, and thatRfan,t andRfln,t, are the corresponding portfolio returns. These returns will generally
diﬀer across countries in the same year because of cross-country diﬀerences in the composition of
asset and liability portfolios.
Next, I introduce the no-arbitrage condition. In a world where financial assets with the same
payoﬀs have the same prices and there are no restrictions on the construction of portfolios (such as
Ferretti data using quarterly capital flows. For a discussion of the diﬀerent methods used to construct return data,
see Gourinchas and Rey (2013).
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short sales constraints), there exists a positive random, Kt+1, such that
1 = Et[Kt+1Rit+1], (2)
where Rit+1 is the (gross real) return on any freely traded asset i. Here Et[.] denotes expectations
conditioned on common period-t information. The variable Kt+1 is known as the stochastic discount
factor (SDF). This condition is very general. It does not rely on the preferences of investors, the
rationality of their expectations, or the completeness of financial markets.4 I assume that it applies
to the returns on every security in a country’s asset and liability portfolios, and so it also applies to
the returns on the portfolios themselves; i.e.
1 = Et[Kt+1Rfan,t+1] and 1 = Et[Kt+1Rfln,t+1]. (3)
Equations (1) and (3) enable me to derive a simple expression for a country’s NFA position.
First I multiply both sides of the budget constraint in (1) by the SDF and then take conditional
expectations. Applying the restrictions in (3) to the resulting expression and simplifying gives
Et [Kt+1NFAn,t+1] = Et [Kt+1(Xn,t+1  Mn,t+1)] +NFAn,t. (4)
Rearranging this expression and solving forward using the Law of Iterated Expectations we obtain
NFAn,t = Et
1X
i=1
Dt+i (Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i) + Et lim
i!1
Dt+iNFAn,t+i, (5)
where Dt+i =
Qi
j=1Kt+j .
The last term on the right-hand-side on (5) identifies the expected present value of the country’s
NFA position as the horizon rises without limit using a discount factor determined by the world’s
SDF. To rule out Ponzi-schemes, I assume that
Et lim
i!1
Dt+iNFAn,t+i = 0, (6)
for all countries n. For intuition, suppose a debtor country (i.e. a country with NFAn,t < 0)
decides to simply roll over existing asset and liability positions while running zero future trade
balances. Under these circumstances, the country’s asset and liability portfolios evolve as FAn,t+i =
Rfan,t+iFAn,t+i 1 and FLn,t+i = Rfln,t+iFLn,t+i 1 for all i > 0. Since Et[Kt+1Xt+1] identifies the
period t value of any period t+1 payoﬀ Xt+1, (4) implies that the value of claim to the country’s net
assets next period is just Et [Kt+1NFAn,t+1] = Et [Kt+1(Xn,t+1  Mn,t+1)] + NFAn,t = NFAn,t.
This same reasoning applies in all future periods, i.e., Et+i [Kt+i+1NFAn,t+i+1] = NFAn,t+i for all
i > 0, so the value of a claim to the foreign asset position ⌧ periods ahead is Et [Dt+⌧NFAn,t+⌧ ] =
4For a textbook discussion of SDFs, see Cochrane (2001); or in an international setting, Evans (2011).
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Et [Dt+⌧ 1E⌧ 1 [Kt+⌧NFAn,t+⌧ ]] = .. = NFAn,t. Taking the limit as ⌧ ! 1 gives NFAn,t =
Et limi!1 [Dt+iNFAn,t+i] < 0. Thus, the country’s current NFA position must be equal to the value
of a claim on rolling the asset and liability positions forward indefinitely into the future. Clearly
then, no country n can initiate a Ponzi scheme in period t when Et limi!1Dt+iNFAn,t+i   0.
Moreover, since
P
nNFAn,t = 0 by market clearing, if Et limi!1Dt+iNFAn˜,t+i > 0 for any one
country, n˜, then at least one other must be involved in a Ponzi scheme. Thus, the restriction in (6)
prevents any country from adopting a Ponzi scheme in period t.
We can now identify the determinants of a country’s NFA position by combining (5) and the
no-Ponzi restriction (6):
NFAn,t = Et
1X
i=1
Dt+i (Mn,t+i  Xn,t+i) . (7)
This equation states that in the absence of Ponzi schemes and arbitrage opportunities, the NFA
position of any country n must equal the expected present discounted value of future trade deficits,
discounted at the cumulated world SDF. As such, it describes the link between a country’s current
external position and the prospects for future trade flows (i.e. exports and imports) and future
financial conditions, represented by the future SDF’s in Dt+i.
Several aspects of equation (7) deserve note. First, the equation is exact; i.e., it contains no
approximations. It must hold under the stated conditions for accurate NFA and trade data given
market expectations and the world SDF. Second, (7) holds whatever the composition of the country’s
asset and liability portfolios (i.e. whatever the fractions held in equity, bonds, etc.), and however
those fractions are determined (by optimal portfolio choice or some other method). Third, the
equation applies simultaneously across all countries. If news about prospective future financial
conditions anywhere change expectations concerning future world SDFs, it aﬀects the NFA position
of all countries that anticipate running future trade surpluses or deficits. Equation (7) also takes
explicit account of risk. It states that a country’s NFA position is equal to the value of a claim to
the future stream of trade deficits in a world where those deficits are uncertain.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the expected future trade flows and SDF on the right-hand-
side of (7) represent the proximate determinants of the country’s NFA position. More fundamental
factors, such as demographic trends, fiscal policy or productivity growth, can only aﬀect the NFA
position insofar as they impact on these expectations. Moreover, since the same SDF applies to all
countries, such fundamental factors can only account for cross-country diﬀerences in NFA positions
insofar as they impact prospective future trade flows.
3.2 Forecasting Implications
Equation (7) implies that all variations in a country’s NFA position reflect revisions in expecta-
tions concerning future trade deficits and the world SDF. Consequently, NFA positions should have
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forecasting power for future trade flows and/or SDFs. To investigate this empirical implication, we
must overcome two challenges: The first concerns the identification of the world SDF, Kt. Section
4 describes how I estimate Kt from data on returns. The second arises from fact that the present
value expression in (7) includes forecasts for Dt+iMn,t+i and Dt+iXn,t+i with Dt+i =
Qi
j=1Kt+j for
all i > 0 rather and forecast for Mn,t+i, Xn,t+i and Kt+i separately. To meet this challenge, I use a
standard approximation.
To approximate the present value expression for each country’s NFA position, I first rewrite (7)
as
NFAn,t = Mn,tEt
1X
i=1
exp
⇣Pi
j=1 mn,t+j + t+j
⌘
 Xn,tEt
1X
i=1
exp
⇣Pi
j=1 xn,t+j + t+j
⌘
, (8)
where t = lnKt is the log SDF, and   is the first-diﬀerence operator. (Throughout I use lowercase
letters to denote the natural log of a variable.) This transformation simply relates the NFA position
to the current levels of imports and exports and their future growth rates,  mn,t+i and  xn,t+i,
rather than the future levels of exports and imports shown in (7).
Next, I approximate to the two terms involving expectations. If  t is a random variable with
mean E[ t] =   < 0, then a first-order approximation to  t+j around   produces
Et
1X
i=1
exp
⇣Pi
j=1 t+j
⌘
= Et exp( t+1) + Et exp( t+1 +  t+2) + ...
' ⇢
1  ⇢ + ⇢Et( t+1    ) + ⇢
2Et( t+1    ) + ⇢3Et( t+2    ) + ....
=
⇢
1  ⇢ +
1
1  ⇢Et
1X
i=1
⇢i( t+i    ), (9)
where ⇢ = exp( ) < 1.
To apply this approximation, I make two assumptions:
E[ mn,t] = E[ xn,t] = g, and (A1)
g +  =   < 0, with E[t] = , (A2)
where E[.] denotes unconditional expectations. Under assumption A1 the mean growth rate for
imports and exports are equal. This will be true of any economy on a balanced growth path and
appears consistent with the empirical evidence for the G7 countries. To interpret assumption A2,
note that in the steady state the log risk free rate r satisfies 1 = E[exp(t)] exp(r). Thus   = g+ '
g  r  12V[t], where V[.] denotes the variance, so A2 will hold provided V[t] > 2(g  r). The mean
growth rate for trade across the countries in the dataset is approximately 6.5 percent, which is well
above any reasonable estimate of the mean risk free rate of close to 1 percent. Clearly then, A2
will only hold if the variance of the log SDF exceeds roughly 0.11 = 2(0.065  0.01). This volatility
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bound is easily exceeded by estimates of the log SDF derived below.
Applying the approximation in (9) to the expectations terms in (8) and simplifying the result
gives
NFAn,t =
⇢
1 ⇢ (Mn,t  Xn,t) + 12(1 ⇢) (Mn,t +Xn,t)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i ( mn,t+i   xn,t+i)
+ 11 ⇢ (Mn,t  Xn,t)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i ( ⌧n,t+i   g)
+ 11 ⇢ (Mn,t  Xn,t)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i (t+i   ) , (10)
where  ⌧n,t = 12 ( mn,t +  xn,t). This expression identifies the three sets of factors determining
a country’s NFA position in a clear fashion. The first term on the right-hand-side identifies the
influence of the current trade balance. This would be the only factor determining the NFA posi-
tion in the stochastic steady state where import growth, export growth and the log SDF followed
i.i.d. processes because the terms involving expectations would equal zero. As such, this first term
identifies the atemporal influence of trade flows on the NFA position. The remaining terms on the
right-hand-side identify the intertemporal factors that were present in (7). In particular they make
clear how expectations concerning future trade flows and financial conditions, represented by the
world SDF, are (approximately) linked to a country’s current NFA position.
The influence of future trade and financial conditions on external positions can be further clarified
with a simply transformation of (10). For this purpose, I define country n0s external position by
NXAn,t =
NFAn,t
Mn,t +Xn,t
  ⇢
1  ⇢TDn,t where TDn,t =
Mn,t  Xn,t
Mn,t +Xn,t
.
In words, the country’s NXA position is defined as the gap between its current NFA position and
the steady state present value of the future trade deficits, all normalized by the current volume of
international trade. Combining this definition with (10) gives
NXAn,t =
1
2(1 ⇢)Et
1X
i=1
⇢i ( mn,t+i   xn,t+i) + 11 ⇢TDn,tEt
1X
i=1
⇢i ( ⌧n,t+i   g)
+ 11 ⇢TDn,tEt
1X
i=1
⇢i (t+i   ) . (11)
Equation (11) provides us with the (approximate) link between a country’s current external
position and expectations concerning future trade flows and the SDF that forms the basis for the
empirical analysis below. For intuition, consider the eﬀects of news that leads agents to revise
their forecasts for future trade deficits upwards. If there is no change in the expected future path
of the SDF, according to (7) there must be a rise in assets prices and/or a fall in liability prices
that produces a rise in NFA if investors are to avoid participation in a Ponzi scheme. This link is
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represented by the first two terms on the right-hand-side of (11).
The third term on the right-hand-side of (11) identifies how news concerning the future financial
conditions, as reflected by the SDF, aﬀects a country’s external position. To illustrate the economic
intuition behind this term, consider the eﬀect of news that lowers agents’ forecasts of the future
SDF but leaves their forecasts for future trade flows unchanged. Under these circumstances, (7)
shows that future trade deficits are discounted more heavily so the country’s current NFA position
is more closely tied to the value of a claim on its near-term deficits. Thus the NFA positions of
countries currently currently running trade deficits deteriorate while the NFA positions of those
running current trade surpluses improve. These variations in NFA are reflected one-to-one in NXA.
Equation (11) contains expectations conditioned on the common information set of agents in
period t, much of which is unavailable to researchers. To take this into account, let  t denote a
subset of agents’ information at t that includes NXAn,t and TDn,t. Taking expectations conditioned
on  t on both sides of (11) and applying the Law of Iterated Expectations, we find that
NXAn,t =
1
2PV( mn,t   xn,t) + TDn,tPV( ⌧n,t   g) + TDn,tPV(t   ), (12)
where PV( t) = 11 ⇢
P1
i=1 ⇢
iE [ t+i| t]. This equation takes the same form as (11) except the
agents’ expectations are replaced by expectations conditioned on  t. Conditioning down in this
manner doesn’t aﬀect the link between the country’s external position and the expectations because
information used by agents is eﬀectively contained in  t via the presence of NXAn,t and TDn,t.
The implications of (12) for forecasting are straightforward. NXA should have forecasting power
for any stationary variable yt+k insofar as expected future values of that variable, E [yt+k| t], are
correlated with the present value terms on the right-hand side of (12). Suppose, for the sake of
illustration, that yt is independent of the trade flows and that the country n’s long-run trade deficit
is equal to TDn. Then a projection of yt+k on NXAn,t (i.e. a regression without an intercept)
would produce a projection coeﬃcient equal to
E [yt+kNXAn,t]
E
⇥
NXA2n,t
⇤ = 1
1  ⇢E
"
TDn,t
1X
i=1
⇢i
E [(t+i   ) | t] yt+k
E
⇥
NXA2n,t
⇤ #
=
TDn
1  ⇢
1X
i=1
⇢i
CV
h
E[t+i| t],E[yt+k| t]
i
E
⇥
NXA2n,t
⇤ .
where CV[., .] denotes the covariance. Notice that in this case the size of the coeﬃcient depends
on the both long run trade deficit, TDn, and the covariance between the expectations of yt+k and
t+i over a range of horizons i. In the empirical analysis below, I examine the forecasting power of
NXAn,t for future trade flows with yt =  mt   xt and yt =  ⌧t, and future financial conditions
with yt = t at particular horizons k. I also study the forecasting power of NXAn,t for trade and
financial conditions over a range of horizons (i.e. for all k   1 ) using time series estimates of
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PV( mn,t   xn,t), PV( ⌧n,t   g) and PV(t   ).
4 Empirical Methods
4.1 Estimating the World SDF
In a fully specified theoretical model of the world economy the world SDF would be identified from
the equilibrium conditions governing investors’ portfolio and savings decisions. Fortunately, for
our purposes, we can avoid such a complex undertaking. Instead, I adopt a “reverse-engineering”
approach in which I construct a specification for the SDF that explains the behavior of a set of
returns; the returns on the asset and liability portfolios for six of the G7 countries.5 This approach
is easy to implement and allows us to empirically examine how prospective future financial conditions
are reflected in external positions.
Let ert+1 denote a k ⇥ 1 vector of log excess portfolio returns, erit+1 = rit+1   rtbt+1, where rit+1
denotes the log return on portfolio i and rtbt+1 is the log return on U.S. T-bills. I assume that the
log of the SDF is determined as
t+1 = a  rtbt+1   b0(ert+1   E[ert+1]). (13)
This specification for the SDF contains k + 1 parameters: the constant a and the k ⇥ 1 vector
b. In the “reverse-engineering” approach values for these parameters are chosen to ensure that the
no-arbitrage conditions are satisfied for the specified SDF. More specifically, I find values for a and
b such that the portfolio returns for the asset and liability portfolios of the six G7 countries and the
U.S. T-bill rate all satisfy the no-arbitrage conditions.
Consider the condition for the i0th portfolio return: 1 = Et[exp(t+1 + rit+1)]. Taking uncondi-
tional expectations we can rewrite this condition as
1 = E[exp(t+1 + rit+1)]
' exp  E[t+1 + rit+1] + 12V[t+1 + rit+1]  . (14)
When the log returns are normally distributed the second line holds with equality because (13)
implies that t+1 and rit+1are jointly normal. Otherwise, the second line includes an approximation
error.
Next, I substituting for the log SDF from (13) in (14) and take logs. After some re-arrangement
this gives
a+ E
⇥
erit+1
⇤
+ 12V
⇥
erit+1
⇤
+ 12b
0V [ert+1] b = CV
⇥
erit+1, er
0
t+1
⇤
b. (15)
5Unfortunately, the data needed to compute the returns on Canada’s foreign asset and liability positions is not
available from the IMF database before 2006, so I use the returns of the other six G7 countries.
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This equation must hold for the T-bill return (i.e., when rit+1 = rtbt+1, or erit+1 = 0 ) so
a+ 12b
0V [ert+1] b = 0. (16)
Imposing this restriction on (15) gives
E
⇥
erit+1
⇤
+ 12V
⇥
erit+1
⇤
= CV
⇥
erit+1, er
0
t+1
⇤
b.
This equation holds for each of the k portfolio returns. So stacking the k equations we obtain
E [ert+1] + 12⇤ = ⌦b, (17)
where ⌦ = V[ert+1] and ⇤ is a k ⇥ 1 vector containing the leading diagonal of ⌦.
Finally, we can solve (16) and (17). Substituting the solutions for a and b in (13) produces the
following expression for the log SDF:
t+1 =   12µ0⌦ 1µ  rtbt+1   µ0⌦ 1(ert+1   E[ert+1]). (18)
By construction, equation (18) identifies a specification for the log SDF such that the uncondi-
tional no-arbitrage condition, 1 = E[exp(t+1 + rit+1)], holds for the k log portfolio returns and the
return on U.S. T-bills. This specification would also satisfy the conditional no-arbitrage condition,
1 = Et[exp(t+1 + rit+1)], if log returns were independently and identically distributed. However,
since this is not the case, we need to amend the specification to incorporate conditioning information.
Consider condition 1 = Et[exp(t+1 + rit+1)]. Let !t be a valid instrument known to market
participants in period t. Multiplying both sides of the no-arbitrage condition by exp(!t) and taking
unconditional expectations produces, after some re-arrangement
1 = E
h
exp(t+1 + r
i,!
t+1)
i
, (19)
where ri,!t+1 = rit+1 + !t   lnE[exp(!t)]. Notice that (19) takes the same form as (14) used in the
constructions of the log SDF in (18). The only diﬀerence is that (19) contains the adjusted log
return on portfolio i, ri,!t+1, rather than the unadjusted return rit+1. This means that we can reverse
engineer a specification for the log SDF that incorporates the conditioning information if we add
adjusted log returns to the set of returns. Specifically, let eri,!
j
t+1 = r
i
t+1   rtbt+1 + !jt   lnE[exp(!jt )]
denote the log excess adjusted return on portfolio i using instrument !jt . If ert+1 now represents
a vector containing erit+1 and er
i,!j
t+1 , the log SDF identified in (18) will satisfy the non-arbitrage
condition
1 = E
h
exp(t+1 + r
i
t+1)
  !jt i ,
for all the portfolio returns i and instruments !jt included in ert+1.
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Three aspects of this reverse engineering procedure deserve comment. First, equation (18) doesn’t
necessarily identify a unique SDF that satisfies the no-arbitrage conditions for a set of returns. In-
deed, we know as a matter of theory that many SDF exist when markets are incomplete. Rather
the specification in (18) identifies one specification for the SDF that satisfies the no-arbitrage condi-
tions. Second, this reverse engineering approach makes no attempt to relate the SDF to underlying
macro factors. This complex task is unnecessary if our aim is simply to identify how prospective
future financial conditions aﬀect external positions. The third aspect concerns the use of instru-
mental variables to control for conditioning information. In principle the conditional expectations
of market participants that appear in the no-arbitrage conditions equal expectations conditioned
on every instrumental variable in their information set. In practice, there is a limit to the number
of instruments we can incorporate into the log SDF specification. I chose instruments that have
forecasting power for log excess portfolio returns and I examine the robustness of my results to
alternative specifications for the log SDF based on diﬀerent instrument choices.
I consider two empirical specifications for the log SDF. The first, denoted by ˆit, is estimated
from (18) without conditioning information. To assess whether the estimates satisfy the no-arbitrage
condition, 1 = E[exp(ˆit+1 + rit+1)|!jt ], I estimate regressions of the form:
exp(ˆit+1 + r
i
t+1)  1 = b1(fan,t   fln,t) + b2(xn,t  mn,t) + vt+1, (20)
where xn,t, mn,t, fan,t and fln,t denote the logs of exports, imports, the value of foreign assets and
foreign liabilities, respectively, for country n. Panel A of Table 1 reports the estimation results for
the log returns on the asset and liability portfolios. Notice that the log ratios of assets-to-liabilities
and export-to-imports are valid instruments so the estimates of b1 and b2 should be statistically
insignificant under the null of a correctly specified SDF. As Panel A shows, this is not the case
for the portfolio returns of four countries. The log asset-to-liability ratio has predictive power for
German, U.K. and U.S. returns, while the log export-to-import ratio has power for the returns on
Japanese assets.
In the light of these results, I incorporate conditioning information in my second specification
for the log SDF, denoted by ˆiit . Specifically, I now add the adjusted log return on U.S. assets,
ri,zt+1 = r
a
us,t+1 + (faus,t   flus,t)   lnE[exp(faus,t   flus,t)], where raus,t+1 is the log return on U.S.
assets, to the set of returns used to estimate the log SDF in (18). This specification incorporates
information concerning the future value of the SDF that is correlated with variations in the U.S.
NFA position. Thus, faus,t   flus,t should not have forecasting power for exp(ˆiit+1 + rit+1)   1
by construction. To check whether the other instruments retain their forecasting power, I then re-
estimate regression (20) with ˆiit+1 replacing ˆit+1. Panel B of Table 1 reports these regression results.
In contrast to Panel A, none of the b1 and b2 coeﬃcient estimates are statistically significant. Notice,
also, that the R2 statistics are (in most cases) an order of magnitude smaller than their counterparts
in Panel A. The asset-to-liability and export-to-import ratios do not account for an economically
-12-
Table 1: Forecasting Returns
Asset Returns Liability Returns
b1 b2 R2 b1 b2 R2
A: ˆi
France 0.059 -0.210 -0.001 0.117 -0.205 0.003
Germany -0.428⇤ 0.669 0.124 -0.442⇤⇤ 0.594 0.129
Italy -1.031 2.436 0.135 -1.009 2.667⇤ 0.143
Japan 0.299 2.304⇤⇤ 0.098 0.327 2.374 0.106
United Kingdom -5.852⇤⇤ 0.324 0.183 -5.843⇤⇤ 0.437 0.177
United States -1.108⇤⇤ 0.216 0.132 -1.059⇤⇤ 0.252 0.115
B: ˆii
France -0.188 -0.636 0.023 -0.116 -0.610 0.017
Germany -0.083 2.824 0.057 -0.091 2.862 0.059
Italy -0.653 -0.668 0.018 -0.653 -0.453 0.016
Japan 0.742 1.809 0.050 0.774 1.874 0.055
United Kingdom -4.595 2.237 0.052 -4.698 2.529 0.054
United States -0.229 0.515 0.022 -0.163 0.558 0.023
Notes: The table reports the OLS estimates of the regression (20) using the it specification
for the log SDF in panel A and the iit specification in panel B. “⇤⇤” and “⇤” indicate
statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regression estimated in
annual data between 1971 and 2011.
meaningful fraction of the variation in exp(ˆiit+1 + rit+1)   1. These findings appear robust to the
choice of estimation period and instruments. Re-estimating (20) over a sample period that ends in
2007 gives essentially the same results. I also find statistically insignificant coeﬃcients in regressions
using ˆiit+1 as the log SDF when GDP growth rates and/or lagged returns are used as alternate
instruments.6
Figure 1 plots the two estimated SDFs, Kˆit = exp(ˆit) and Kˆiit = exp(ˆiit ), together with the inverse
of the real return on U.S. T-bills, 1/Rtbt . In the special case where the expected excess portfolio
returns on assets and liabilities are zero, equation (18) implies that the SDF is equal to 1/Rtbt . Thus
diﬀerences between 1/Rtbt and the estimated SDF’s arise because the SDFs must account for the
expected excess portfolio returns. As the plots clearly show, both estimates of the SDF are more
volatile than 1/Rtbt . In fact, variations in the log return on U.S. T-bills contribute less than one
percent to the sample variance of ˆit and ˆiit . Changes in U.S. T-bill returns do not appear to have an
economically significant impact on estimates of the SDF that “explain” returns on asset and liability
portfolios in major economies. The plots in Figure 1 also show that there are numerous episodes
where the estimated SDFs are well above one. Ex ante, the conditionally expected value of the SDF,
EtKt+1, identifies the value of a claim to one real dollar next period. So safe dollar assets sold at a
premium during periods where these high values for the SDF were forecast ex ante.
6Recall that specification for t in (18) was derived using a log normal approximation to evaluate expected future
returns. Based of these regression estimates, there is no evidence to suggest that the approximation is a significant
source of specification error for ˆiit .
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Figure 1: SDF Estimates
Notes: The figure plots two estimates of the world SDF, Kˆit = exp(ˆit) and Kˆiit = exp(ˆiit ), with t determined
in (18); and the inverse of the real return on U.S. T-bills, 1/Rtbt .
4.2 Estimating External Positions
The estimates of the log SDF, ˆiit , allow us to pin down the discount rate ⇢ = exp(g + ) used
in computing the NXA positions and the present value terms in equation (12). Recall that g is
the unconditional growth rate for exports and imports, which I estimate to be 0.064 from the
pooled average of import and export growth across countries. My estimate of  computed from
the average value of ˆiit is -0.59. These estimates, denoted by gˆ and ˆ, imply a discount rate of
⇢ = exp(gˆ + ˆ) = 0.586. This is the value I use to construct the NXA measures of each country’s
external position.
Figure 2 plots the NXA positions for each country in the dataset between 1980 and 2011. The
upper panel shows that the NXA positions for all but one of the G7 countries have remained between
±1 during the past 30 years. The one exception is the Japanese NXA position, which persistently
increased from 0.1 to 2.6 during the period. Variations in the NXA positions of countries outside
the G7 are generally larger. The plots in the lower panel of Figure 2 show large improvements in the
external positions of India and South Korea while Australia’s NXA position has remained largely
unchanged. It is also interesting to note that the steady improvement in the NXA position of China
in the last twenty years is not nearly as pronounced as the improvement in Japan’s position.7 Of
7The span of the sample period is much too short for unit roots tests to provide reliable information on the whether
the true process for each country’s NXA position is stationary. On the other hand the economic logic embedded in
equation (12) implies that NXAn,t is indeed a stationary process, and so my analysis in Section 5 proceeds under
this assumption.
-14-
course the time series for the NXA positions reflect changes in NFA positions and trade deficits both
measured as a fraction of annual trade, NFAn,t/(Mn,t + Xn,t) and (Mn,t   Xn,t)/(Mn,t + Xn,t).
Plots for these variables are shown in the Web Appendix.
Figure 2: NXA Positions
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4.3 Long-Horizon Forecasts
In principle, variations in the NXA positions could reflect revisions in the expectations concerning
the entire path for future imports, exports and the SDF. One way to investigate this possibility would
be to estimate regressions of realized present values; i.e.,
Pk
i=1 ⇢
iyt+i for yt = { mt  xt,  ⌧t  g,
t   }, on NXAn,t for some finite horizon k. For example, with ⇢ equal to 0.586, ⇢i < 0.01 for
i > 8, so a finite horizon of eight or nine years ought to be suﬃcient for this purpose. Unfortunately,
there are two well-known econometric problems with this approach. First, the coeﬃcient estimates
may suﬀer from finite sample bias when the independent variables are persistent and predetermined
but not exogenous (see, e.g. Campbell and Yogo 2006). Second, the asymptotic distribution of the
estimates provides a poor approximation to the true distribution when the forecasting horizon is
long relative to the span of the sample (see, e.g. Mark, 1995), as it would be here with just a 40
year span.
To avoid these problems, I examine the relation between the NXA positions and
P1
i=1 ⇢
iEˆtyt+i,
where the conditional expectations Eˆtyt+i are computed from VARs. Specifically, let the vector zt =
[ yt, ., .. ]
0 follow a p0th. order VAR, which can be written in companion form as Zt = AZt 1 + Ut,
where Zt stacks the zt vectors appropriately. I estimate the present value for yt by
dPV(yt) = 11 ⇢ P1i=1 ⇢iEˆtyt+i = ⇢1 ⇢ ı1Aˆ(I   ⇢Aˆ) 1Zt, (21)
where ı1 is a vector that picks out the first row of Zt (i.e., yt = ı1Zt) and Aˆ denotes the esti-
mated companion matrix from the VAR. [The 1/(1   ⇢) term is included for compatibility with
the expression for the NXA position in equation (12)]. I compute present values for trade flows
where yt =  mn,t    xn,t or yt =  ⌧n,t   gˆ from VARs estimated country-by-country, and for
the log SDF with yt = iit   ˆ using a single world-wide specification. In all these calculations
⇢ = exp(gˆ + ˆ) = 0.586.
I estimate the present value terms involving future trade flows (i.e., dPV( mn,t    xn,t) anddPV( ⌧n,t  gˆ)) from VARs that include the import-export growth diﬀerential  mn,t  xn,t, trade
growth  ⌧n,t, and the log export-to-import ratio xn,t  mn,t. Below I report results based on first-
order VARs estimated separately for each country, n; higher-order VARs give very similar results.
In addition, I considered estimates that included NXAn,t and the log return on U.S. T-bills, rtbt , in
the VARs. The results presented below are robust with respect to the presence of these variables.8
I also use a VAR to compute the present value of the log SDF, dPV(ˆiit   ˆ). In this case the VAR
includes ˆiit   ˆ, the log return on U.S. T-bills, rtbt , the U.S. inflation rate, ⇡ust , the spread between
the real yields on ten and one year U.S. T-bonds, sprust , and the average rate of real GDP growth
across the G7,  yG7t . In addition, I use the VAR to compute the present value of the log return on
8The Web Appendix examines the time series predictability of the import-export growth diﬀerential and the trade
growth diﬀerential across the countries in the sample. It also documents the results of Grange Causality tests from
the estimated VARs.
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U.S. T-bills, dPV(rtbt   rˆtb), where rˆtb is the sample average of rtbt . Comparing dPV(ˆiit   ˆ) withdPV(rtbt   rˆtb) proves useful when we examine how future financial conditional are reflected in the
NXA positions below.
5 Results
5.1 Forecasting Future Trade Flows
I begin by examining the short-horizon forecasting power of the NXA positions for trade flows. Panel
A of Table 2 reports slope coeﬃcients, (heteroskedastic-consistent) standard errors and R2 statistics
from regressions of yt+1 on a constant and NXAn,t for each of the countries, n, over the full sample.
Columns I and II show estimates where yt+1 =  mn,t+1   xn,t+1 and yt+1 = ( ⌧n,t+1   gˆ)TDn,t
are the forecast variables, respectively. These are the trade flows that appear in the present value
terms that determine the NXA position of country n in equation (12). The estimates in column III
use the combination of trade flows that appears on the right-hand side of (12).
The results in Panel A of Table 2 show that information contained in the NXA positions con-
cerning future near-term trade flows diﬀers considerably across countries. Among the G7, there is
no evidence that the NXA positions contain information about next year’s import-export growth
diﬀerential; none of the estimated slope coeﬃcients are statistically significant at conventional lev-
els. By contrast, the NXA positions of China and South Korea appear to have reasonably strong
forecasting power for the diﬀerential. In both cases an increase in the NXA position forecasts a rise
in  mn,t+1  xn,t+1. Ceteris paribus, this is consistent with equation (12). For perspective on the
size of coeﬃcient estimates, the value of 10.3 implies that an increase in the Chinese NXA position
of 0.1 forecasts an increase in the growth diﬀerential of approximately one percent.
External positions have more widespread forecasting power for trade growth. Column II shows
that six slope coeﬃcients are statistically significant at the one percent level. According to (12),
an increases in NXAn,t should, ceteris paribus, forecast a rise in trade growth for current deficit
countries and a fall in growth for surplus countries. This prediction is not borne out in five of
the six countries with significant coeﬃcients. Finally, column III shows the forecasting power of
the NXA positions for the combined trade flows. Here there is very little evidence of any short-
horizon forecasting power. With the exception of China, none of the estimated slope coeﬃcients are
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and all the R2 statistics are extremely small.
All-in-all, the results in Panel A suggest that variations in prospective near-term trade flows play
no more than a minor role in driving variations in external positions. This doesn’t mean that future
trade flows are irrelevant. On the contrary, changes in external positions could reflect revisions in
expectations concerning the entire future path for trade flows (i.e. expectations well beyond the one
year horizon studied above). The results in Panel B of Table 2 allow us to examine this possibility.
Here I report the estimates from regressions of the VAR-based present values of trade flows on a
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constant and NXAn,t. Notice that these are not forecasting regressions - the dependent variable is
not the realized present value of the future trade flows. Rather the regressions measure the degree to
which changes in the present value of future trade flows computed from VAR forecasts are reflected
in NXAn,t variations.9 If the forecasting information captured by the VARs is also embedded in
agents’ expectations that are reflected in the NXA positions, we should expect to find positive and
statistically significant slope coeﬃcients.
The results reported in Panel B generally confirm this prediction. The slope coeﬃcients in
column I are positive and highly statistically significant for nine countries. And, judging by the
R2 statistics, the variations in NXAn,t capture a sizable portion of the variance in the VAR-based
present values for the import-export growth diﬀerential. This evidence is consistent with notion
that the information contained in the long-term VAR forecasts for  mn,t+i   xn,t+i is positively
correlated with that used to form the actual expectations embedded in the NXA positions. The
estimates based on French data prove an exception to this pattern. Here the slope coeﬃcient is
negative and highly statistically significant - a counterintuitive finding. The estimates shown in
Panel II continue this pattern. In this case the slope coeﬃcients are positive and highly statistically
significant in seven countries, with France again proving the exception. Column III shows how the
VAR-based forecast for the combined future trade flows relate to external positions. Again, the
slope coeﬃcients are positive and highly significant for most countries (except France). It is also
worth noting that the R2 statistics from these regressions are over 0.5 in the U.K., China, India,
and Thailand. The time series variations in the NXA positions of these countries during the past
40 years are quite informative about changes in the VAR forecasts of future trade flows.
Overall, the results in Table 2 are consistent with the view that changing expectations about
trade flows far into the future contribute to the year-by-year variations in the NXA positions of many
countries. Expectations concerning near-term trade flows appear far less relevant. These results are
broadly consistent with the findings reported by Gourinchas and Rey (2007a). They estimate that
changing expectations concerning future trade flows account for approximated 30 percent of the
cyclical variations in the U.S. external position between 1952 and 2004. Here variations in the U.S.
NXA position are strongly correlated with the forecasts of future trade flows, but not as strongly as
the NXA positions of other countries.
5.2 Forecasting Future Financial Conditions
I now consider the influence of prospective financial conditions on country’s external positions.
Panel A of Table 3 reports on the short-horizon forecasting power of the NXA positions for diﬀerent
measures of future financial conditions. As above, the table shows slope coeﬃcients, (heteroskedastic-
9The VAR-based present values used as left-hand-side variables in these regressions include some sampling error.
Importantly, the results reported in the table are derived from VARs that do not include NXAn,t, so there is no
reason to suspect that this sampling error contributes to the estimated regression coeﬃcients. Furthermore, when I
estimate regressions using VAR-based present values that include NXAn,t in the VAR specification, I obtain very
similar results.
-19-
consistent) standard errors and R2 statistics from regressions of the forecast variable on a constant
and NXAn,t estimated over the full sample. Recall that variations in the expected log SDF only
aﬀect NXAn,t insofar as the country is running a current trade surplus or deficit, so the forecast
variables are multiplied by the current trade deficit, TDn,t, to be consistent with the right-hand-side
of (12).
Column I shows the results when NXAn,t is used to forecast the one-year ahead deviation of
the log SDF from its unconditional mean multiplied by the current trade deficit, (ˆiit+1   ˆ)TDn,t.
Recall that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the expected future SDF should raise (lower) the NXA
position of a deficit (surplus) country because future trade imbalances are discounted more heavily
when valuing current asset and liability positions. So, if revisions in expected near-term financial
conditions are a source of NXAn,t variations over the sample, and those expectations are reflected in
actual conditions as represented by the SDF estimates, we should see positive and significant slope
coeﬃcients in the forecasting equations. The estimates in Column I show that this is the case for
four countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, India and South Korea. NXAn,t does not appear to
have significant near-term forecasting power across the other countries, with the exception of France;
where, once again, the significant negative coeﬃcient is counterintuitive.10
Columns II and III provide further perspective on these findings. Here I show the results from
forecasting regressions that include the log return on U.S. T-bills, rtbt+1. In the absence of arbi-
trage opportunities 1 = Et[exp(ˆiit+1 + rtbt+1)], which (approximately) implies that Et[t+1 + rtbt+1] =
  12Vt[iit+1 + rtbt+1], where Vt[.] denotes the conditional variance. Subtracting unconditional expec-
tations from both sides and re-arranging using (18) gives
Et[t+1   ] =  Et
⇥
rtbt+1   rtb
⇤  12 {Vt[b0ert+1]  E [Vt[b0ert+1]]} . (22)
Thus, changing expectations concerning the future SDF must either reflect revisions in expected
future T-bill returns and/or changes in perceived risk measured by the conditional variance of future
excess portfolio returns on asset and liabilities across the major economies.
Column II shows the regression results when the T-bill returns (multiplied by the trade deficit)
are the forecast variable. Here we see a diﬀerent cross-country pattern of forecasting power. The
NXA position have forecasting power for near-term T-bill returns in Italy, Japan, Australia, China
and Thailand; all countries where NXAn,t appeared not to forecast the log SDF. When judged by
the R2 statistics, these forecasting results are particularly strong in the Chinese and Thai cases.
Column III shows results when ˆiit+1 + rtbt+1 (multiplied by the trade deficit) is used as the forecast
variable. Mathematically, the estimated slope coeﬃcients are equal to the diﬀerence between their
counterparts in columns I and II, but economically they show the extent to which changing per-
10Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) found that the U.S. external position had forecasting power for the return on the
net asset position and the return diﬀerential between equity assets and liabilities at the quarterly horizon between
1952 and 2004. One possible reason for the diﬀerence between their findings and the U.S. forecasting results in Panel
A is that NXAn,t exhibits a good deal more persistence than the cyclical component of the U.S. external position
they use.
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ceptions concerning near-term risk is reflected in the NXA positions. Notice that the cross-country
pattern of the coeﬃcient estimates closely corresponds to the pattern in column I. To the extent
that NXAn,t variations reflect prospective near-term financial conditions, revisions in perceived risk
appear more important than expectations concerning future returns on U.S. T-bills.
Of course NXAn,t variations may reflect revisions in expectations concerning the SDF further
into the future. To gauge the importance of variations in these long-horizon expectations, Figure 3
plots the estimated present value for the log SDF, dPV(ˆiit   ˆ), and minus one times the estimated
present value of the return on U.S. T-bills  dPV(rtbt   rˆtb). The plotted series are computed from a
VAR estimated from the full sample. Alternative series derived from a VAR estimated on pre-crisis
data (1971-2006) follow a similar pattern. As the figure clearly shows, time series variations in the
present value for the log SDF follow a cyclical pattern and are much larger in magnitude than the
changes in the present value of the log return on U.S. T-bills. This means that the changing VAR
forecasts for the log SDF largely reflect revisions in perceived future risk, represented by the last
term on the right-hand-side of (22). For example, the sizable swings in the log SDF between 1998
and 2008 appear to reflect, in turn, an large rise, fall, and rise again in expectations concerning the
level of risk well into the future.
Figure 3: The Present Value of the log SDF
Notes: The figure plots the estimated present value of the log SDF,dPV(ˆiit   ˆ), and minus one times the
present value of the log return on U.S. T-bills  dPV(rtbt   rˆtb).
To what extent are these estimates of changing risk perceptions reflected in the NXA positions?
To address this question Panel B of Table 3 reports estimates from regressions of the VAR-based
present values of the log SDF and T-bill returns on a constant and NXAn,t. As in Panel A, the
-22-
dependent variables in these regressions are multiplied by the trade deficit for consistency with the
right-hand-side of (12). The estimates in Column I show that the variations in NXA are only weakly
related to those in dPV(ˆiit   ˆ)TDn,t for many countries. The most notable exception is the United
States, where the estimated slope coeﬃcient is positive, highly statistically significant, and the R2 is
0.19. This finding contrasts with the U.S. estimates in Panel A, where the coeﬃcient is insignificant
and the R2 statistic is smaller that 0.01. It suggests that changes in the U.S. external position
are in part a reflection of changing perceptions concerning future financial conditions beyond the
immediate future, particular future risk. The NXA positions of three other countries also appear
to reflect prospective future financial conditions. The estimate slope coeﬃcient on the French NXA
position is positive and significant, but the regression R2 is only 0.1, while those for India and South
Korean are negative and significant.
The cross-country pattern of statistical significance changes when we focus on forecasts for U.S.
T-bill returns. Column II shows that the NXA positions of many countries are quite closely related
to  dPV(rtbt   rˆtb)TDn,t: the estimated slope coeﬃcients are significant at the five percent level in
eight countries. To interpret these estimates, recall from Table 2 that most country’s NXA positions
appeared to reflect prospective future trade conditions. Their NXA positions will also reflect long-
term forecasts for U.S. T-bill returns insofar as they are correlated with their forecasts for future
trade flows. The estimation results in column II reflect these correlations and the importance of
expected future trade flows for the determination of NXA across countries. Finally, note that the
results in column III closely mirror those in column I. This is due to the fact that the changing VAR
forecasts for the future log SDF primarily reflect revisions in the forecasts of risk rather than U.S.
T-bill returns (see Figure 3).
Overall, the results in Table 3 provide only limited support for the view that revisions in expecta-
tions about future financial conditions contribute significantly to the changing NXA positions across
countries. Although the VAR s forecasts reveal sizable and persistent swings in the present value
of the log SDF, the NXA positions of most countries are not strongly correlated with this measure
of prospective financial conditions. The one notable exception to this pattern is the United States,
where variations in the NXA position are strongly correlated with the estimated present value of
the future SDF.
6 Conclusion
In the absence of Ponzi schemes and arbitrage opportunities, the NFA position of any country must
equal the expected present discounted value of future trade deficits, discounted at the cumulated
world SDF. In this paper I investigated the forecasting implications of this theoretical insight. To
do so, I first developed a measure of a country’s external position, NXAn,t, that is simply linked to
expectations of future trade flows and the log SDF. I also showed how the SDF can be estimated
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from cross-country data on returns. With these tools I then studied the near-term forecasting power
of 12 country’s NXA positions for trade flows and the SDF, and the statistical link between the
NXA positions and VAR forecasts for the paths of trade flows and the SDF far into the future.
Overall, my empirical findings support the prediction that the external positions of most countries
reflect (in part) expectations about the future path for trade flows. Evidence on the role of future
financial conditions is less clear cut. While the VAR forecasts for SDF suggest that there have been
persistent and sizable variations in the prospective future financial conditions that are relevant for
the determination of NXA positions, only the U.S. NXA position is strongly correlated with these
forecasts. This suggests that identifying the impact of future financial conditions on many country’s
NXA positions requires a more structural empirical investigation than the simple forecasting exercise
undertaken here. One possibility along these lines would be to extend the VAR methods pioneered
by Campbell and Shiller (1987) to allow for the nonlinearity between the trade deficits and the
present value terms in equation (12) - a possibility I leave for future work.
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Appendix
A Data Description
Figure A1 provides a visual perspective on the behavior of external positions and trade flows across
the world’s major economies. Panels A and C plot the ratio of each country’s NFA position (i.e., the
diﬀerence between the value of its foreign asset and liability portfolios) to GDP between 1980 and
2011. These plots display two noteworthy features. First, they clearly show that variations in the
NFA/GDP ratios of many countries are highly persistent, with significant movements often lasting
decades. The second feature concerns the dispersion of the ratios across countries. Panel A shows
that the dispersion has increased markedly across the G7 in the last decade, with ratios ranging from
-20 to 80 percent of GDP in 2011. With the notable exception of Canada, imbalances between the
value of foreign assets and liabilities have been steadily growing across the G7 for the past 30 years.
Panel C shows that the dispersion in NFA/GDP ratios also increased across the non-G7 countries in
the last decade. Panels B and D plot the ratios of net exports (exports minus imports) to GDP for
the comparable countries over the same sample period. Again, we can see that these ratios display a
good deal of time series persistence. Among the G7, the ratios have become most dispersed since the
early 1990s, while there is no clear change in the dispersion of the ratios among the other countries.
The plots in Figure A1 follow the standard practice of measuring NFA positions and net exports
relative to GDP. This normalization facilitates comparisons of external positions and trade flows
across countries with economies of diﬀerent sizes at a point in time, but is less useful when considering
dynamic links between current positions and future trade flows on a country-by-country basis. To
help understand why, Figure A2 plots the sum of foreign asset and liability positions as a fraction
of GDP and the sum of exports and imports as a fraction of GDP for each of the countries in
the dataset between 1980 and 2011. Clearly, both trade and gross foreign positions have been
growing persistently relative to GDP in every country. Moreover, it is clear that gross positions rose
particularly rapidly in the last decade. The plots in Figure A2 also illustrate how the cross-country
diﬀerences in the degree of openness (both in terms of trade flows and gross positions) have increased
over time.
Table A1 provides statistical evidence complimenting the plots in Figure A2. Panel A reports
sample statistics for the annual growth in trade, gross positions, and the export-import growth
diﬀerential. Trade growth is computed as the average growth rate for real exports and imports
1
2 ( xt+ mt), position growth by the average growth in foreign assets and liabilities
1
2 ( fat+ flt),
and the export-import diﬀerential as the diﬀerence between the growth in exports and imports,
 xt    mt; where xt, mt, fat and flt denote the logs of exports, imports, the value of foreign
assets and foreign liabilities, respectively; and   is the first-diﬀerence operator. (Throughout I use
lowercase letters to denote the natural log of a variable.) As the table shows, mean trade growth
and mean position growth are similar across the G7 countries, with mean position growth roughly
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two to four precent higher. Cross-country diﬀerences in mean trade and position growth rates are
more pronounced across the other countries. The mean export-import growth diﬀerentials shown
in the right-hand columns are small by comparison. Some of the cross-country diﬀerences in the
mean trade and position growth rates reflect diﬀerences in the degree of economic development that
in turn are reflected in GDP growth. This can be seen in Panel B where I report statistics for
trade growth and position growth relative to GDP growth, measured as 12 ( xt + mt)   yt and
1
2 ( fat+ flt)  yt, respectively; where yt is the log of real GDP. Here the cross-country diﬀerences
in mean growth rates are much smaller. Notice, however, that mean rates are all positive. Averaging
across all the countries, trade grew approximately 2.6 percent faster than GDP, while foreign asset
and liability positions grew 4.8 percent faster.
Figure A2 and Table A1 show that, on average, the growth in global trade and financial positions
have greatly exceeded global output growth in the last three decades. Year-by-year, the picture is
more complicated. Figure A3 plots the five-year moving average of the cross-country average for
GDP growth, trade growth and position growth between 1980 and 2011. These growth rates are
computed as 1N
P
n yn,t,
1
2N
P
n( xn,t+ mn,t) and
1
2N
P
n( fan,t+ fln,t), respectively; from
the trade and position data of each country n = {1, 2, ...N}. The plots reveal that swings in global
trade growth and position growth have been much larger than global business cycles represented by
the growth in GDP. The size and timing of the swings in position growth are even more striking. The
last three decades witnessed two episodes of increasingly rapid growth in foreign asset and liability
positions; the first in the mid-1980’s and the second between 2000 and 2006. Conversely, growth
declined markedly in three episodes; the first in the early 1980’s, the second following the 1997 Asian
crises, and the third starting in 2007. The first and third episodes also witnessed a significant fall
in trade growth.
The growth in both trade and positions relative to GDP present a challenge, because these
features are absent from standard models. For example, in typical open-economy DSGE models
consumers’ preferences tie exports and imports to relative prices and domestic consumption (see,
e.g. Evans, 2011). In these models relative prices are constant in the steady state so exports and
imports share the same trend as output. This means that trade growth cannot exceed output growth
in the long run. Similarly, open-economy models with many financial assets predict that position
growth equals output growth in the long run, so a country’s position shares the same long run trend
as GDP (see, e.g., Evans, 2014, or the models surveyed in Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012).
-A5-
Figure A3: Global Growth Rates
Notes: The figure plots the five-year moving average of the cross-country averages for: (i) GDP growth
1
N
P
n yn,t, (ii) trade growth
1
2N
P
n( xn,t + mn,t) and (iii) position growth
1
2N
P
n fan,t +
 fln,t) all in annual percent.
B Forecasting Trade and the SDF
Table A2 provides information on the time series predictability of the import-export growth diﬀer-
ential and trade growth across the countries in the sample. Specifically, here I report the estimates
from two regressions:
 mn,t+1   xn,t+1 = c0 + c1(xn,t  mn,t   bµn) + c2( mn,t   xn,t) + vn,t+1 (23)
and  ⌧n,t+1   gˆ = d0 + d1(xn,t  mn,t   µˆn) + d2( ⌧n,t   gˆ) +  n,t+1, (24)
where µˆn denotes the sample average of xn,t mn,t. The left-hand-panel of the table shows that there
is a good deal of time series predictability in the import-export growth diﬀerential. In all but four
countries, the estimates of c1 are positive and statistically significant. Thus, future imports tend to
grow at a faster rate than exports when the log export-to-import ratio is above its historical norm
(i.e., µˆn). This pattern of predictability is consistent with the presence of cointegration between
xn,t and mn,t. Lagged import-export growth also has predictive power in the case of the United
States and China. The estimates of regression (24) reported in the right-hand panel show much less
evidence of predictability in trade growth. In only two countries, Australia and India, are any of
-A6-
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the slope coeﬃcients statistically significant at the five percent level. I also estimated augmented
versions of regressions (23) and (24) that included NXAn,t as an additional right-hand-side variable.
Table A2 reports the asymptotic p-values for tests of the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on
NXAn,t in these regression equal zero. As the table shows, there is little evidence to reject this
null in the regressions for the import-export growth diﬀerentials. In the case of the trade growth
regressions, the p-values are quite small for France, Italy, Australia and South Korea, indicating
that NXAn,t may have incremental forecasting power in these countries.
Table A2: Forecasting Trade Flows
Import-Export Growth Trade Growth
c1 c2 R2 P-value d1 d2 R2 P-value
Canada 9.095 0.275 0.108 0.322 10.845 0.089 0.080 0.132
France 19.963⇤⇤ 0.015 0.136 0.724 4.349 0.113 0.015 0.058
Germany 12.903⇤⇤ 0.119 0.103 0.722 -5.917 0.036 0.016 0.770
Italy 17.201⇤⇤ 0.134 0.126 0.092 -1.743 -0.045 0.003 0.071
Japan 15.729⇤⇤ 0.195 0.114 0.899 -9.487 -0.185 0.076 0.507
United Kingdom 10.169 0.229 0.091 0.693 1.890 0.165 0.028 0.407
United States 26.553⇤⇤ 0.663⇤⇤ 0.510 0.312 -4.950 0.031 0.018 0.600
Australia 8.058 0.039 0.033 0.390 4.276 -0.284⇤⇤ 0.130 0.021
China 46.757⇤⇤ 0.272⇤⇤ 0.309 0.913 14.897 0.282⇤ 0.106 0.289
India 13.477⇤⇤ 0.121 0.129 0.455 11.936⇤⇤ 0.153 0.147 0.498
South Korea 13.852⇤⇤ 0.070 0.151 0.794 -6.968 0.014 0.062 0.032
Thailand 11.297 -0.244 0.135 0.322 1.930 0.034 0.004 0.378
Notes: The left- and right-hand panels reports the OLS estimates of the slope coeﬃcients and the
R2 statistics from regressions (23) and (24), respectively. Each row reports estimates for country n.
The column headed “P-value” reports the p-value for the null that the coeﬃcient on NXAn,t equals
zero computed from augmented versions on (23) and (24) that include NXAn,t as an additional
right-hand-side variable. “⇤⇤” and “⇤” indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions estimated in annual data between 1971 and 2011.
Table A3 reports the results of Grange Causality tests for all of the equations in the first-order
VAR used to estimate the present values of the log SDF, dPV(ˆiit   ˆ), and the log return on U.S.
T-bills, dPV(rtbt   rˆtb). The table shows that there is a good deal of time-series predictability among
the variables: many of the p-values for the null of no Granger Causality are extremely small.
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Table A3: Grange Causality Tests for SDF VAR
VAR Equations
Forecasting
Variables ˆiit   ˆii rtbt ⇡ust  yG7t sprust
ˆiit   ˆii 2.265 3.880 0.165 0.264 11.772
(0.132) (0.049) (0.684) (0.608) (0.001)
rtbt 0.593 275.525 117.032 0.907 12.038
(0.441) (0.000) (0.000) (0.341) (0.001)
⇡ust 0.585 5.301 707.723 5.417 0.132
(0.444) (0.021) (0.000) (0.020) (0.716)
 yG7t 0.140 0.212 57.861 11.324 29.779
(0.709) (0.646) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
sprust 3.726 3.978 21.967 23.438 66.432
(0.054) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: The tables reports  2 statistics for the null that the coeﬃcients on (lags
of) the forecasting variables listed on left are equal to zero in the VAR equations
for the variables listed at the head of each column. Asymptotic p-values are
reported in parenthesis. Test are computed from estimates of a first-order VAR.
Entries equal to 0.000 denote p-values <0.001.
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